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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the strategic relationship between trade policy
in a managed protection regime and commercial exchange at prices below normal value.
It presents a three-stage model of imperfect competition that incorporates the possibility
for the government authority to influence the production decisions of companies through
a credible threat, by means of a specific tariff. This methodology—in a context of segmen-
ted markets, Cournot conjectures, and the application of an optimal tariff—generates a
mechanism of incentives (which are not sufficient from a social welfare perspective) for
domestic and foreign companies to practice reciprocal dumping. A general conclusion
is that a free trade policy would be counterproductive, since it would eliminate the in-
centives that domestic and foreign companies would have to carry out the commercial
exchange that would diminish the loss of welfare associated with the existence of mono-
polies in both markets.
JEL Classification: F12
Keywords: Cournot competition, Managed trade, Reciprocal Dumping
Dumping recíproco óptimo bajo un régimen de protección
administrada
Resumen
El propósito de este artículo es el de examinar la relación estratégica que existe entre la
política comercial en un régimen de protección administrada y el intercambio comercial
a precios por debajo del valor normal. Presento un modelo de competencia imperfecta en
tres etapas que incorpora la posibilidad de que la autoridad gubernamental influya sobre
las decisiones de producción de las empresas a través una amenaza creíble, mediante el
uso de un arancel específico. Esta metodología, en un contexto de mercados segmenta-
dos, conjeturas à la Cournot y la aplicación de un arancel óptimo, genera como resultado
un mecanismo de incentivos -que no son suficientes desde una perspectiva de bienestar
social-, para que las empresas doméstica y extranjera realicen una práctica de dumping
recíproco. Una conclusión general, es que una política de libre comercio sería contra-
producente, pues ésta eliminaría los incentivos que las empresas doméstica y extranjera
tendrían para realizar el intercambio comercial que disminuiría la pérdida de bienestar
asociada a la existencia de monopolios en ambos mercados.
Clasificación JEL: F12
Palabras clave: Competencia Cournot, Comercio administrado, Dumping Recíproco.
1I would like to thank participants at the XXVII Coloquio Mexicano de Economía Matemática y
Econometría, as well as two anonymous referees who helped improve earlier versions of this manuscript.
2Universidad Anáhuac México Campus Norte, Av. Universidad Anáhuac 46, Col. Lomas Anáhuac,
Huixquilucan, Estado de México, C.P. 52786. Tel: 56270210 ext. 8161. Buzón electrónico: alber-
to.gallegos@anahuac.mx.
190
REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance)
Optimal Reciprocal Dumping in a Managed Trade Regime
1. Introduction
Without any doubt, the Uruguay Round (UR) has been one of the cornerstones in the
relatively recent development and flourishing of international trade. Trade barriers that
prevailed in the post-war era were lowered following the principles of the original Gene-
ral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Agreement (GATT 47). However, new protectionist
measures have recently been arising, threatening to offset the gains derived from the
continuing liberalization of the international trade.
Antidumping and countervailing duties have been one of the most popular and active
forms to "preventünfair trade practices among Members of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), but its popularity is mainly due, inter alia, to the ambiguities of the legal
procedure to find the causal link between the margin of dumping and the material injury
observed and the lack of a much more formal methodology of proof of injury, which has led
to several discreet interpretations. Nevertheless, in the last successful multilateral nego-
tiation, Members of the WTO were agreed in making certain amendments and inclusions
in order to implement the Antidumping Agreement as we know it nowadays3.
The last decade widespread use of the antidumping code among some emerging and
advanced countries alike, has called the attention of several economists concerned with the
effects of the antidumping duties on the international trade and the arise of just another
form of the so called new protectionism. Miranda et. al. (1998), mentioned that the
application of the antidumping code has become a back-door clause, specially used when
closed economies have started liberalizing its trade policy towards a freer trade. Finger
(1992), pointed out that the use of antidumping measures is just a customized way to
apply custom-valuation procedures and then, a new form of protectionism. Boltuck (1987),
justifies the application of antidumping duties in the unlikely event of finding predatory
dumping and points out that the antidumping code is like an .escape valve"for those
domestic firms that claim for protection at any cost.
There is a vast literature on the price-discrimination between national markets on
the grounds of the unfair competitive aspects of the practice by itself, the motives to
incur in this illegal practice of international trade, along with a number of variants about
the effects of the price-discrimination in terms of the "softness.or .aggressiveness.of the
implicit price-competition between firms and also, a number of papers that distinguish
global and domestic welfare effects of practicing dumping, even reciprocally or reversely
between countries4.
In this paper, I analyze the optimal dumping that reflects the use of administered
protection through the application of optimal trade taxes to identify welfare implications
of the practice of reciprocal price-discrimination between national markets, fueled by the
limited credibility that the government has, providing administered protection5.
Following Brander and Krugman (1983), Dixit (1988) and Regibeau and Gallegos
(2004), in this paper the main insight can be analyzed with a model of two countries and
two firms that face a monopoly distortion in autarky, and at the same time, that both
firms have the perception of a market segmentation in the counterpart’s market that
makes each firm to have extraordinary revenues, if competition takes place at a lower
price in the counterpart’s market6.
3The Uruguay Round was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay; on September of 1986, and ended in
Marrakesh, Morocco; on April 1994.
4For a recent literature review on dumping, see Blonigen and Prusa (2015), and Nelson (2006). For a
review on dumping investigations and dispute settlement issues, see Feinberg and Reynolds (2018).
5For a review on this argument see Brander and Krugman (1983), Dixit (1984), Brander and Spencer
(1985), Regibeau and Gallegos (2006), and Gallegos (2017).
6This argument is crucial to build a case of bilateral trade where the practice of dumping takes place.
Unlike Dixit (1988) and Lahiri (1990), this paper does not assume that to dump in a foreign market, a
subsidy from the government to the domestic firm, must be necessary.
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In so doing, I propose a three-stage game: i) during the first stage, domestic and
foreign firms take an entry-choice decision in its own market, ii) in the second stage, the
domestic government chooses the degree of administered trade protection, and iii) during
the third stage, domestic and foreign firms dump each other competing à la Cournot in
the domestic and foreign markets.
In this model, the sequence of the game is crucial: it explores the strategic interaction
between oligopolistic firms and governments in an international trade context. Brander
and Spencer (1983), Spencer and Brander (1983) and Eaton and Grossman (1986), pointed
out how the profit-shifting motive for intervention -correctly sequenced-, through the
implementation of an optimal trade policy well before firms make their choice, can improve
national welfare by influencing the strategic interaction between firms.
The mechanism linking the practice of reciprocal dumping and trade in this paper, is
that trade provides home and foreign governments with a credible threat that motivates
home and foreign firms to reciprocally dump in each other’s market. The credibility of this
limited commitment relies upon the fact that both home and foreign governments have a
clear incentive to protect a firm with the aim to dump in a foreign market, expecting that
the protected firm will be dumped in its national market. In this context, moving from
autarky to free trade would be disadvantageous as it would remove the incentives national
and foreign firms have to trading each other through the unfair practice of reciprocally
dumping.
Unlike Oshiro (2013), where tariff competition and sufficiently low transport costs led
to a free trade equilibrium, in this model, the optimal tariff depends on the price elasticity
of the demand in the segmented market and the market share of the dumped exports in
the national market. In this context, a policy of free trade would be counterproductive
because it would eliminate the private incentives both firms have to reciprocally dump.
Instead of assuming that national and foreign firms produce a homogeneous good,
Friberg and Ganslandt (2008) designed a model of reciprocal dumping with product dif-
ferentiation that extends the analysis of intra-industry trade with differentiated products
in a price-competition framework. Friberg and Ganslandt (2008), pointed out that trade
can reduce welfare when moving from autarky to free trade in a Cournot type model,
for any degree of product differentiation. This result is aligned with that of Brander and
Krugman (1983), where transport costs of the iceberg-type might be so high, that more
than compensate gains coming from the consumer and producer surpluses.
In Section I, I set up the model and show general results for an implicit inverse demand
function. In Section II, I use a linear inverse demand function to show specific results
through the three-stage game of this model where the optimal trade tax is obtained. In
Section III, I extend the model to allow for a non-cooperative interaction between home
and foreign governments in setting up the optimal trade tax. The paper ends with some
concluding remarks.
2. The Model
Consider a model with two open economies, home and foreign, and two identical firms.
Both firms have symmetric cost structures and produce a homogeneous good. In autarky
both firms act as a monopoly. Both countries trade each other, only if there is a perception
of a segmented market demand in the counterpart’s market, and if there is a transport
cost not too high.
The model is designed as a three-stage game. During the first stage, the domestic firm
chooses to enter the market at a cost F, implicitly determining its productive capacity7. In
the second stage, the domestic government commits to give .administered"trade protection
in the form of a specific trade tax t, preventing the domestic firm to be "predated"from
7If the fixed cost is set too high, unless the government commits to administer protection in the second
stage, firms do not invest. Firms in specific sectors like steel, cement, cupper, oil, etc., are of this type.
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the foreign country. At the third stage, the domestic and foreign symmetric firms compete
à la Cournot in the domestic and foreign markets.
In this context, both home and foreign countries are small open economies that percei-
ve that there is a market segmentation in the counterpart’s market and face not prohibitive
transport costs. As is usual, I will solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward
induction.
A natural generalization of this setting is to allow for conjectural variations, even in
the case where marginal costs are set to be zero with the aim to eliminate any "strategic
trade.effects, and to further explore using a specific inverse parametric demand function.
2.1 Third stage: firms compete à la Cournot
During the third stage of the game, each firm believes that the other will hold its output
fixed while the output level of that firm changes8. At this point, each firm has already
considered that both markets are segmented. Profit functions for each of the firms take
the following form:
pi1 (x1, x2; t1) = P (Q)x1 + P (Z) y1 − cx1 − (c+ τ + t2) y1 − F1 (1)
For the domestic firm, and:
pi2 (y1, y2; t2) = P (Q) y2 + P (Z)x2 − cy2 − (c+ τ + t1)x2 − F2 (2)
For the foreign firm9.
Where Q = x1 + x2, represents the domestic market demand, whereas Z = y1 + y2,
represents the foreign country’s market demand, so that P (Q) and P (Z) are the prices
for the domestic and the foreign markets, respectively, where the Cournot competition
takes place.
Likewise, F stands for the fixed cost of entry, and t1 is the specific trade tax ”admi-
nistered” by the domestic government, while t2 is the specific trade tax .administered"by
the foreign government. Finally, I consider a constant marginal cost of production c for
the domestic and foreign production levels and τ to export between countries, considering
symmetric cost structures between countries.
Naturally, for the domestic market, reaction functions are obtained directly from ∂pi1∂x1 =
pix1 = 0 = pix2 =
∂pi2
∂x2
. The foreign market reaction functions are similarly obtained from:
∂pi1
∂y1
= piy1 = 0 = piy2 =
∂pi2
∂y2
. Therefore, for the domestic market:
pix1 = P (Q) + P
′ (Q)x1 − c = 0 (3)
pix2 = P (Q) + P
′ (Q)x2 − (c+ τ + t1) = 0 (4)
With second order conditions ∂∂xi
[
∂pii
∂xi
]
= pixixi < 0, for any i = 1, 2, and
∂
∂xi
[
∂pii
∂xj
]
=
pixixj < 0, for any i 6= j, so that I have for the domestic market:
pix1x1 = 2P
′ (Q) + x1P
′′
(Q) < 0 (5)
pix2x2 = 2P
′ (Q) + x2P
′′
(Q) < 0 (6)
At this point, the question would be about the effect of the trade tax t1 on the
production levels realized for the domestic market. Totally differentiating eqs. (3) and (4)
to get the answers for the following expressions: dx1dt1 and
dx2
dt1
, I obtain:
pix1x1dx1 + pix1x2dx2 + pix1t1dt1 = 0 (7)
pix2x1dx1 + pix2x2dx2 + pix2t1dt1 = 0 (8)
8This means that dqi
dqj
= 0 for any i 6= j
9The foreign firm exports to the domestic country which has an import tariff in place.
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Since pix1t1 = 0 and pix2t1 = −1, the equation system can be solved simultaneously to
obtain:
dx1
dt1
= −pix1x2∆ > 0 (9)
dx2
dt1
=
pix1x1
∆ < 0 (10)
Where ∆ = pix1x1pix2x2 − pix2x1pix1x2 > 010.
Provided the Routh-Hurwitz condition for reaction function stability takes place, eqs.
(9) and (10) clearly show that an increase in the trade tax t1, leads to a domestic out-
put increase, while decreasing simultaneously the foreign output’s share in the domestic
market.
The analysis in the foreign country is quite similar. I will take the second subset of
reaction functions. In the foreign market these are: ∂pi1∂y1 = piy1 = 0 = piy2 =
∂pi2
∂y2
. Then I
obtain:
piy1 = P (Z) + P
′ (Z) y1 − (c+ τ + t2) = 0 (11)
piy2 = P (Z) + P
′ (Z) y2 − c = 0 (12)
With second order conditions ∂∂yi
[
∂pii
∂yi
]
= piyiyi < 0, for any i = 1, 2, and
∂
∂yi
[
∂pii
∂yj
]
=
piyiyj < 0, for any i 6= j, i.e., for the foreign market:
piy1y1 = 2P
′ (Z) + y1P
′′
(Z) < 0 (13)
piy2y2 = 2P
′ (Z) + y2P
′′
(Z) < 0 (14)
Totally differentiating eqs. (11) and (12) to obtain the effects of t2 on the production
levels y2 and y1, I obtain symmetric results as those shown for the domestic market from
the following equation system for the foreign country:
piy1y1dy1 + piy1y2dy2 + piy1t2dt2 = 0 (15)
piy2y1dy1 + piy2y2dy2 + piy2t2dt2 = 0 (16)
Since piy1t2 = −1 and piy2t2 = 0, this equation system can be solved simultaneously to
obtain:
dy1
dt2
=
piy2y2
∆ < 0 (17)
dy2
dt2
= −piy2y1∆ > 0 (18)
Where ∆ = piy1y1piy2y2 − piy2y1piy1y2 > 0.
As I expected, the effect of the trade tax on the domestic exports’ market share in the
foreign market is negative, whereas the effect of the trade tax on the foreign production
market share is positive. In both markets, the application of trade taxes, shifts to the left
the counterpart’s reaction function, reducing its counterpart’s market share.
10Worth noting is that çross effects.are weaker than .own effects.on the reduction of the marginal
revenue, i.e., pixixi < pixixj for any i 6= j.
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Proposition 1: An increase in the trade tax committed by the domestic
government:
a) Increases the domestic price of the good,
b) Increases the domestic market share,
c) Increases domestic profits, and
d) Reduces foreign profits.
Proof:
a) dP(Q)dt1 =
P′(Q)
∆ [pix1x1 − pix1x2 ] > 0
b)
d(
x1
Q )
dt1
= − (x2
pix1x2
∆ +x1
pix1x1
∆ )
Q2 > 0
c) dpi1dt1 = x1P
′(Q)pix1x1∆ > 0
d) dpi2dt1 = −x2< 0
2.2 Second stage: the domestic government determines the optimal
trade tax t1:
Under freely managed trade and with the aim to determine the optimal trade tax for the
domestic economy, I proceed to examine the consumer and producer surpluses and trade
revenues. These three elements allow me to have an expression for the domestic welfare
function:
W1(·) =
∫ Q
0
P (Q)dQ− P (Q)Q+ pi1(·) + t1x2 (19)
First, let us obtain the sign of the optimal trade tax by obtaining dW(t1)dt1 = 0. Therefore,
on the consumer surplus the effect of the trade tax is as anticipated:
dW1(·)
dt1
= −QP′(Q)(pix1x1−pix1x1∆ < 0 (20)
Provided:
dx1
dt1
= −pix1x2∆ > 0
dx2
dt1
=
pix1x1
∆ < 0
On the producer surplus, the general expression is:
dpi1
dt1
= ∂pi1∂x1
dx1
dt1
+ ∂pi1∂x2
dx2
dt1
+ ∂pi1∂y1
dy1
dt1
+ ∂pi1∂y2
dy2
dt1
+ ∂pi1∂t1
dt1
dt1
(21)
From the first order conditions for the domestic firm, I know that:∂pi1∂x1 = 0 =
∂pi1
∂y1
. On
the other hand, from eq. (1) I know that ∂pi1∂t1 = 0. As for the remaining of the first order
conditions for the domestic firm, although mixed between firms and countries, choices on
y2 -taken by the foreign firm-, and on x1 -taken by the domestic firm-, can be thought of
separately for firms 1 and 2, respectively11. Finally, for the producer surplus the effect of
the trade tax is unambiguously positive, as it was expected:
dpi1
dt1
= x1P
′(Q)pix1x1∆ > 0 (22)
Regarding the tariff revenue, the following expression reflects the negative effect the
specific trade tax has on x2, but considering that the specific trade tax is not prohibitive,
this effect should be non-negative in a context where the trade tax plays the role of a
countervailing duty12.
11Note that for this reason ∂pi1
∂y2
= 0.
12Dixit (1988), pointed out that due to the existence of market imperfections, cases of perfect com-
petition and monopoly are pure benchmark theoretical cases, so that the application of a countervailing
duty must be seen as a second-best trade policy.
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d(t1x2)
dt1
= t1
pix1x1
∆ + x2 ≥ 0 (23)
Naturally, there is a negative effect coming from the consumer surplus, but as long as
the trade tax is not prohibitive, that effect can be more than compensated by the effect
of the trade tax on the producer surplus and the tariff revenues, plus the gain in the
consumer surplus as a result of the practice of reciprocal dumping, so that the optimal
trade tax would be no negative:
topt1 = QP
′ (Q)
[
1− pix1x1pix1x2
]
− x1P ′ (Q)− x2 ∆pix1x1 ≥ 0 (24)
Accordingly, the optimal t1 would be a function of the price elasticity of the demand
in the domestic country, and the market share of the foreign exports in the domestic
country13, i.e., topt1 = f (α, η) (+) (+) ≥ 0. Where: α = x2x1+x2 represents the market share
of the foreign output in the domestic market demand, and η = dQdP
P
Q , the price elasticity of
the demand in the domestic country. The result shown in eq. (24) lead us to the following
proposition:
Proposition 2: Even though the domestic government has a limited commit-
ment, it has an incentive to independently provide a trade tax to the domestic
firm because dumping is better than autarky for producers and consumers.
At this stage of the game, even though the government has a limited commitment, the
sequence of the game -with the trade tax offered before the Cournot competition takes
place-, influences firms’ behavior, so that the non-cooperative equilibrium of the domestic
government favors the domestic firm.
The intuition behind this result is as if the trade tax applied by the domestic govern-
ment in stage two, with the aim to protect the domestic firm, played the role of a crossed
subsidy on exports of the foreign firm. In this context, there is a profit-shifting motive
for intervention14.
2.2.1 A specific demand function: a general linear demand function
Following Brander and Krugman (1983), if I define α = x2Z as representing the market
share of the foreign output in the domestic market demand, and η = dQdP
P
Q =
P (Q)
P ′(Q)Q ,
as the price elasticity of the demand in the domestic country, I use the inverse linear
demand function that exhibits standard features to obtain explicit solutions on P, η, and
the domestic trade tax t1. Be the inverse linear demand function the following:
P (Q) = 1− (x1 − x2) (25)
From the first order conditions for the domestic economy, i.e., equations (3) and (4),
and further defining α = x2x1+x2 , this implies that 1 − α = x1x1+x2 , and η =
dQ
dP
P
Q =
1−(x1+x2)
x1+x2
, I obtain from eqs. (3) and (4)15:
P = ηcη+(1−α) (26)
P = η(c+τ+t1)η+α (27)
By solving simultaneously eqs. (26) and (27), I obtain solutions for the domestic price
P and the implicit market share of the foreign exports in the domestic market:
13Although it is clear that dy1
dt2
< 0, the direct effect of the trade tax on at the prohibitive level will be
zero
14Unlike Brander and Spencer (1983), in this case, both reaction functions shift, so that the Stackelberg-
Nash-equilibrium -when no trade tax is explicitly applied for the domestic country-, cannot be replicated.
15Notice that if by definition x1+x2
Q
= 1, then x1
Q
= 1− x2
Q
= 1− α.
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α∗ = c+(1+η)(τ+t1)2c+τ+t1 (28)
P ∗ = η(2c+τ+t1)2η+1 (29)
From eq. (28) the specific trade tax can be seen as a function of the transport cost
the price elasticity of demand in the counterpart’s market η16.
t1 =
τ(1+η−α∗)+c(1−2α∗)
(α∗−1−η) (30)
At this point, I naturally ask for the effects of the trade tax on the market share of the
foreign country’s exports in the domestic country, and the determination of the domestic
price, i.e., in looking for answers for dα
∗
dt1
and dP
∗
dt1
, I obtain:
dα∗
dt1
= c(1+2η)
(2c+τ+t1)
2 > 0⇔ η > − 12 (31)
dP∗
dt1
= η2η+1 > 0⇔ η > − 12 (32)
The intuition behind eq. (30) is that once the domestic firm takes the çommitment.of
its own government to provide administered protection as given, the foreign firm acknow-
ledges that the domestic firm will start exporting at a lower price than that prevailing in
its own market before trade takes place17. At this point, the foreign firm that also has a
çommitment.of its own government to provide .administered protection", does exactly the
same as its counterpart: increasing the amount of exports to the domestic country, the-
refore, increasing its external market share. Answers to both questions are also expected
in the absence of free trade18.
Worth noting is that equations (28) and (29) show a relationship between P and α:
P must be clearly higher than c + τ , for trade to take place. This means that for any
positive α, for P to be positive, I need:
η > c+ττ−t1 (33)
In other words, the price elasticity of the domestic demand should be higher than
c+τ
τ−t1 , as long as t1 < τ , in order to have an interior solution for the price elasticity of the
domestic market demand.
To determine the explicit solution for the optimal trade tax, I will follow the same
methodology as before, i.e., totally differentiating the social welfare function in eq. (19).
In doing so, I obtain the expressions for the consumer and producer surpluses, and the
tariff revenue to analyze the welfare function of the domestic economy and finally obtain
the optimal trade tax:
topt1 =
1−τ−c
3 (34)
When I substitute the optimal trade tax already obtained to have interior solutions
for x1 and x2, I obtain a relationship between the marginal cost c and the transport cost
τ :
2c− 2 < τ < 1−c4 (35)
16Worth noting is that dt1
dτ
< 0 while dt1
dη
=
c(1−2α∗)
(α∗−1−η)2 > 0⇔ α∗ <
1
2
andη > − 1
2
.
17Both dα
∗
dt1
and dP
∗
dt1
do depend on η > − 1
2
. This means that the price elasticity of the domestic
demand must reflect sufficient sensibility in order to have these results, in line with the domestic and
foreign firms’ perceptions about segmented markets, as already pointed out.
18The domestic country is imposing a trade tax, leaving aside the "free"trade regime. That is why the
foreign exports’ share reacts"positively to an increase in the domestic trade tax. Therefore, applying a
trade tax does not reduce domestic welfare.
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Clearly, eq. (37) leads to the following relevant intervals for these parameters: c ∈ (0, 1)
and τ ∈ (0, 14).
Considering that in autarky conditions the domestic firm acts as a monopoly, the
domestic firm has the following profit function:
piA = P (Q)xA − cxA (36)
Where P (Q) is assumed to be the linear inverse demand function as before, i.e.,
P (Q) = 1 − xA, with crepresenting as before, the marginal cost of production. In this
case, the domestic firm acts as a monopolist with the following quantity choice ∂pi
A
∂xA
= 0:
xA = 1−c2 ⇒ (37)
P (Q) = 1+c2 ⇒
piA = (1−c)
2
4
In this context, the implicit optimal dumping results from comparing the monopoly
price determined by the domestic firm when the domestic country is in autarky PA, with
the price with dumping considering the optimal trade tax PD. Accordingly, the inequality
chain from the monopoly price to the marginal cost of production is the following:
PA = 1+c2 > P
D = 4+2τ+5c9 > c+ τ > c (38)
For its realization, the price in the dumping scenario must not be lower than the
marginal plus the transport costs, condition that is guaranteed if as it has already been
mentioned: c ∈ (0, 1) and τ ∈ (0, 14)19.
2.3 First stage: entry choice
At this stage of the game, the choice to enter the market for the domestic firm will reflect
the possibility to obtain positive net benefits from having administered protection in a
context of reciprocal dumping, compared to a situation of autarky that may cover or not,
the fixed cost of entry F1. In other words, the domestic firm will entry if:
pi1(t
opt
1 )− pi1(t1 = 0) = F1 (39)
However, this means that the private incentive to enter the market may not be suffi-
cient from the social welfare point of view. To analyze this, I examine through the private
domestic welfare.
Let us define B1 = pi1(t
opt
1 )−pi1(t1 = 0) as the domestic firm’s incentive to dump in the
foreign country, once substituting topt1 using the general linear inverse demand function,
I obtain the following expression for the domestic private welfare:
B1 = pi1(t
opt
1 )− pi1(t1 = 0) (40)
In the absence of managed trade protection, the autarky equilibrium for the domestic
firm implies that the domestic firm will have the following profit20:
piM1 (t1 = 0) =
(1−c)2
4 (41)
And if both countries are reciprocally dumping at each other’s market I obtain:
19Notice that according to the graph, adding the gain achieved on the consumer surplus to the domestic
firm’s markup, might be insufficient to compensate the cost of importing homogeneous product from
abroad at c+ τ , instead of c, when the monopoly in place is clearly in autarky for comparison matters.
20Worth noting is that if countries are set to have a policy of free trade, there are no incentives for the
firms to dump in the counterpart’s market.
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pi1(t
opt
1 , t
opt
2 ) =
(
4+2τ−4cx
9
)2
+
(
1−4τ−cy
9
)2
(42)
To finally get an explicit expression for the domestic private welfare in eq. (42):
B1 =
(
4+2τ−4cx
9
)2
+
(
1−4τ−cy
9
)2
− (1−cx)24 ≥ F1 (43)
If I additionally assume that both firms have symmetric cost structures with cx = c =
cy, where c, τ  0, and c ∈ (0, 1) with τ ∈
(
0, 14
)
, the domestic private welfare is positive
B1 ≥ 0 and an increasing function in the transport τ and the marginal ccosts21.
However, from the private welfare point of view and for entry costs F1 relatively high,
there might be not enough private incentives to enter the market and to dump in the
counterpart’s market.
3. Two governments: optimal specific trade taxes
In this section, actions and best responses of both domestic and foreign countries are
considered in looking for the subgame perfect equilibrium at each of the stages of the
game as in the analysis of the previous subsection, with just one country determining
its optimal trade tax. In so doing, it is worth mentioning that the foreign firm has a
symmetric cost structure and faces virtually the same incentives to dump in the domestic
country. In this context, assuming that the inverse demand functions are linear in each
country, the full set of reaction functions during the quantity-choice third stage game is
the following:
For the domestic and foreign markets:
∂pi1
∂x1
= pix1 = 0 = pix2 =
∂pi2
∂x2
(44)
∂pi1
∂y1
= piy1 = 0 = piy2 =
∂pi2
∂y2
(45)
Solving both systems allows us to see symmetric responses in terms of the quantity
choice for both domestic and foreign countries:
In the domestic market:
x1 =
1+τ+t1−cx
3 (46)
x2 =
1−2τ−2t1−cx
3 (47)
And in the foreign market:
y1 =
1−2τ−2t2−cy
3 (48)
y2 =
1+τ+t2−cy
3 (49)
The resulting market demands and price in the domestic market:
Q = 2−τ−t1−2cx3 (50)
P (Q) = 1+τ+t1+2cx3 (51)
And in the foreign market:
Z =
2−τ−t2−2cy
3 (52)
P (Z) =
1+τ+t2+2cy
3 (53)
21Worth noting is that:
∂
(
∂B1
∂c
)
∂τ
> 0 and
∂
(
∂B1
∂c
)
∂c
> 0⇔ c−1
5
< τ < 13−13c
16
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Along with the profit functions in the domestic and foreign markets:
pi1 =
(1+τ+t1−cx)2
9 +
(1−2τ−2t2−cy)2
9 − F1 (54)
pi2 =
(1+τ+t2−cy)2
9 +
(1−2τ−2t1−cx)2
9 − F2 (55)
As is usual, by backward induction I solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium in the
specific-trade-tax-choice in the second stage identifying the domestic and foreign welfare
functions:
W1(·) =
∫ Q
0
P (Q)dQ− P (Q)Q+ pi1(·) + t1x2 (56)
W1(·) =
∫ Q
0
P (Q)dQ− P (Q)Q+ pi1(·) + t1x2 (57)
Proposition 3: The global Nash equilibrium for the optimal specific trade
taxes where both countries are reciprocally dumping each other, is described
by positive trade taxes in both countries.
Proof: First order conditions from equations (56) and (57), i.e., dW(t1)dt1 = 0 =
dW(t2)
dt2
,
yield: topt1 =
1−τ−cx
3 , for the domestic market and t
opt
2 =
1−τ−cy
3 , for the fo-
reign market; where: τ + cx < 1, andτ + cy < 1, to have non-negative trade
taxes.
The last two conditions define the home and foreign optimal policies as in the
home country case alone. However, it is worth noting that home and foreign
governments are only concerned about local production and that they can
only influence the choice made by its representative firms through its managed
trade policy, not their counterparts.
In this context, there is an additional element that deserves our attention.
If there were a managed-trade-protection game between home and foreign
governments, although the production choice does accrue to each firm, it is
true that it also depends on the çredible commitment"both governments have
to grant managed trade protection.
Therefore, even though firms’ production decisions do not depend on the ac-
tion of its rival’s government, we could have a subgame perfect equilibrium
where governments credible commit or not to grant managed trade protection.
In that case, the subgame has the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
To formalize this, let us obtain the home and foreign welfare expressions in the
context of this subgame perfect equilibrium. The following table concentrate
the results when I further assume without losing of generalization that cy =
c = cx and zero transport costs τ = 0 are taking place:
t1 = 0 t1 =
1−τ−c
3
t1 = 0
2
9 (1− c)2 ; 29 (1− c)2 2581 (1− c)2 ; 29 (1− c)2
t2 =
1−τ−c
3
2
9 (1− c)2 ; 2581 (1− c)2 2581 (1− c)2 ; 2581 (1− c)2
These results clearly show that the unique equilibrium is where both firms are
protected, this case generates the higher gross domestic private benefits22.
22By assuming zero transport costs, i.e., τ = 0, we do not loose generality as long as otherwise,
τ ∈ (0, 1
4
)
.
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Proposition 4: Any trade liberalization from the optimal upper bound tariff:
t = 1−τ−c3 , can never increase domestic and/or foreign welfare.
Once the optimal trade tax is obtained, if that level were an upper bound from where
liberalization started, it will not generate sufficient private incentives for the domestic and
the foreign firms to dump in its counterpart’s market, so that the domestic and foreign
firms would have a production choice as if they were in a situation of autarky. At this
point, it should be clear that in this model, autarky is never an optimal choice.
3.1 Domestic welfare
To explore how private and social incentives to dump interact each other, I will compa-
re the change in the domestic social welfare that is obtained from the practice of dumping
in the context of this model i.e., ∆W1 to the private incentive net of the investment cost,
i.e., B1 − F1. The abovementioned change can be examined in the following equation:
∆W1 = ∆CS1 + ∆PS1 + ∆TR1 (58)
The first term in eq. (58) represents the change in the consumer surplus, i.e., ∆CS,
which is unambiguously positive even though trade protection rises the domestic price
to a level higher than that observed under the potential practice of dumping without
the managed trade regime. The second term -the change in the producer surplus net of
the investment cost F1-, is clearly negative as long as the equilibrium price under the
managed trade regime is lower than the price obtained under autarky conditions23. The
third term reflects the change in trade revenues, i.e., ∆TR, and is clearly positive when
changing from autarky to trade under this specific trade regime, as long as the trade tax
be non-prohibitive. At this point, the main analysis is performed to examine:
∆W1 − (B1 − F1) = ∆CS1 + ∆TR1 (59)
Where the change in the consumer surplus is the following:
∆CS = CS1
(
topt1
)− CS1 (t1 = 0) = (5−5cx−2τ)2162 − (1−cx)28 (60)
Which is clearly positive for strictly positive values of the marginal cost and the
transport cost c, τ  0, and c ∈ (0, 1) with τ ∈ (0, 14). As for the change in trade
revenues, I obtain the next expression:
∆TR1 = t1x2 =
(
1−cx−τ
3
) (
1−cx−4τ
9
)
(61)
Therefore,
∆W1 − (B1 − F1) = (5−5cx−2τ)
2
162 − (1−cx)
2
8 +
(
1−cx−τ
3
) (
1−cx−4τ
9
) ≥ 0 (62)
is clearly positive for all relevant values of c and τ .
Proposition 5: The managed trade regime provides both social and private
incentives to dump in the counterpart’s market, but from the social perspec-
tive, these incentives are not enough when the sunk costs to enter the market
are in the range F1 ∈ (B1 − F1).
The social benefits of dumping in the counterpart’s market while being reciprocally
dumped in its own market -net of private benefits-, are positive for all relevant values of
marginal production and transport costs. Naturally, sunk costs represented by F1 can be
23Worth noting is that the total change in the producer surplus, i.e., dPS, must be analyzed taking
into account the sunk cost F1, i.e., dpi1 − F1.
Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 189-202
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21919/remef.v14i2.309 201
potentially high, but if F1 falls in the range (B1 − F1), there are no private incentives
that compensate social welfare loses to reciprocally dump: adding the sunk cost F1 to
transport and marginal production costs, i.e., τ and c, would prevent from the practice
of reciprocally dumping itself.
3.2 Global welfare
This section’s main concern is about the effects of the managed trade regime on global
welfare. On the one hand, it has been pointed out that there are clear incentives for
the domestic and foreign firms to dump each other as long as: i) the perception of the
segmented market leads to generate extra revenues from dumping in the counterpart’s
market, and ii) there is a credible commitment of the government to provide administered
protection preventing the price from falling below perfect-competition levels once the
practice of dumping has taken place. However, for sufficiently high levels of F1 and F2,
although privately desirable, the practice of dumping might not take place and therefore,
trade taxes’ influence on firm’s behavior would be null.
To obtain the expression of the world welfare we will add up the expressions for the
domestic and foreign welfare in equations (56) and (57) in the following way:
WW = W1 +W2 =∫ Q
0
P (Q)dQ− P (Q)Q+ pi1(·) + t1x2 +
∫ Z
0
P (Z)dZ − P (Z)Z + pi2(·) + t2y1 (63)
Then substituting topt1 =
1−τ−cx
3 and t
opt
2 =
1−τ−cy
3 , allowing the practice of dumping
to exist, and comparing with a situation where the practice of dumping does not take
place, i.e., t1 = 0 = t2, this expression becomes:
WW = W1
(
topt1 , t
opt
2
)−W1 (t1 = 0, t2 = 0) +2 (topt1 , topt2 )−W2 (t1 = 0, t2 = 0) (64)
Finally,
∆WW = (5−5c−2τ)
2
81 +
2(2τ−4c+4)2
81 +
2(1−4τ−c)2
81 +
2(1−c−τ)(1−c−4τ)
27 − 3(1−c)
2
4 ≥ 0 (65)
This expression is positive for all relevant values of τ and c, i.e., c,τ  0, where
c ∈ (0, 1) while τ ∈ (0, 14).
Proposition 6: Global welfare is higher under reciprocal dumping in a mana-
ged trade regime. Any bilateral trade liberalization can never increase global
welfare.
Like in the domestic welfare analysis, any trade liberalization from the optimal trade
tax, being even and unbound tariff, will only deprive domestic and foreign firms with
sufficient incentives to start trading each other.
4. Conclusions
Far beyond the theoretical treatment to the antidumping code and the application of
antidumping duties, it is clear that it has been used as a relief to the import competing
industries in both advanced and emerging economies. The lack of analytical formal guide-
lines to determine the margin of dumping, the material injury and their causality in the
antidumping agreement, have led to unreliable findings to the antidumping authorities.
Nevertheless, as in the case of the antitrust system, the possibility to make the type I-
error punishing the competitive behavior is very high. Fortunately, the multilateral system
through the Dispute Settlement Body gives the opportunity to settle trade disputes that
arise due to the application of the antidumping agreement. Although the aim of this
body is to prevent trade retaliations between members, the ultimate word belongs to the
countries which may misunderstood the application of the agreements.
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It is important to mention that the market distortions caused by the practice of
dumping in the domestic economy are very important as to counteract its effects, but
the antidumping agreement should only be applied as a second-best policy due to the
imperfections and the asymmetries in the international markets’ structure.
The limited commitment the domestic and foreign countries have to sustain a managed
trade regime in a context of segmented markets, provide the necessary private economic
incentives to build a case of international trade where the monopoly distortion is reduced
with the practice of dumping. In this context, it is highly recommendable to include
retaliatory costs while the practice of dumping is still seen as illegal and predatory all
over the world.
The optimal trade tax provides protection to the segmented markets reducing the ef-
ficiency achieved at dumping prices. Even though the price that consumers face is higher
under the managed trade regime, this price is still lower than the price realized under au-
tarky conditions. However, there are welfare costs associated with the volume of imports
of the homogeneous product: as long as the market participation of imports be positive,
transport costs reduce welfare in both countries. The balance between the sources of wel-
fare gains and losses, depend on the specific form the market demand takes place and the
level of the transport cost.
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